accountable. This seems so, given that as a regional body, it has allowed itself to be utterly inadequate to the task envisioned by the organ in resolving the Zimbabwe crisis. The paper concludes that the sum of all this has had the effect of exposing SADC and it being perceived as a weak regional organisation.
Introduction
In the Gaborone communiqué of 28 June 1996, the Republics of Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the Kingdoms of Lesotho and Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo, took a decision to establish the Southern African Development Community (SADC) protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDS). This decision took notice of Article 9 of the SADC treaty which established the organ. This was pursuant to Article 4 of the SADC treaty, which expects member states to conduct themselves in accordance with the core principles of sovereign equality of all member states; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; equity and peaceful settlement of disputes. Through the SADC Protocol on Politics,
Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDS) commonly referred to as the Protocol or
Organ, the regional body reaffirmed the need to achieve solidarity peace and security through close cooperation. Article 2 (a) of the Protocol seeks to protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state and inter-state conflict and aggression. Further to this, Article 2 (b) provides for the promotion of co-operation among state parties and the evolution of common political values and institutions. Furthermore, in terms of Article 2 (c) the regional body is expected to promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to that end.
However the extent to which these Articles are enforceable by SADC is questionable and the modus operandi for achieving this in practice is unclear. The operationalisation of the protocol is still littered with grey areas, one of the most intractable being the extent to which member states can in practice be held accountable for their actions and inactions. The greatest challenge seems to be the extent to which member states can recognize and re-affirm the principles of strict respect to sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs of member states and at the same time enforce values and principles of the treaty? What seems to be emerging in practice is that, whatever the intentions of SADC leaders, the grouping lacks a mechanism to enforce its principles if they are violated. This article argues that Deutsch, Sidney, Robert, Maurice Jr, Martin, Raymond, Francis, & Richard's (1957:3-5) , powerful concept of a security community theory, can potentially be used to understand and explain the means by which peace can
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be maintained in a regional organisation such as SADC. This paper argues that this theory can further be used as a lens to examine how peaceful resolutions can be reached in a region such as SADC, where "political turmoil" and mounting threats to peace and security exist. In SADC such conflicts are, exemplified by for instance instabilities and conflicts in Madagascar, the reluctance of the political elite to open up political space for competition in Swaziland, the seemingly intractable economic and political meltdown in Zimbabwe, as well as a fragility of the peace accord in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Thus, the paper seeks to contribute to regional integration and security, in the sense that whilst much has been written on SADC itself, the potential of the OPDS to realise the SADC Treaty's vision of a security community has not been interrogated and analysed in theory and practice within the context of the role of SADC on the Zimbabwe crisis.
This thus presents a compelling case through which to examine SADC's actual workings, strengths and weaknesses. The article argues that the obstinate Zimbabwe crisis mirrors how SADC's principles and values were tested and acted upon in practice and the precarious position the OPDS found itself as it attempted to operationalise the principles of peace, security, human rights and democracy as set out in Article 4 of the SADC treaty.
SADC Historical Overview
In 1973 the White Paper on Defence, in South Africa first introduced the concept of the 'Total Strategy', which was further elaborated in the succeeding White Papers on Defence of 1975 and 1977 (Smith, 1990:10) . South Africa argued that it faced a "total onslaught', aimed at "the overthrow of the then constitutional order and its replacement by a communist-oriented, black government" (Geldenhuys, 1984:209) . The 'Total National Strategy' concept was later developed and adopted as official policy in 1978. Its objective was to counter the perceived threat of a conceited attack on the "South African" society.
The 'total strategy' was officially defined as a comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to the state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve national aims within the framework of specific policies (South Africa, 1977:5) . South Africa's foreign policy towards its neighbours during that epoch was widely destabilization. It marked a policy of aggressive military and economic interventions, both direct and 24 AFRICA'S PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY & PERFORMANCE REVIEW indirect in the region. These internal developments reflected South Africa's regional policy and in turn stimulated conflict, tension, and military expenditure both inside South Africa and in the wider region. On the other hand, and as far back as 1969, independent Africa's opposition to apartheid and colonialism in southern Africa was formally coordinated in the form of the 'Lusaka Manifesto'. This document later became a touchstone of the Front Line States' political alliance. However, up until the mid-1970s
South Africa was well insulated from proximity with its independent, anti-apartheid neighbours by a buffer zone of colonial territories.
The regional outlook however changed dramatically from the mid-1970s onwards. The 'Front Line States' formed an alliance to fight apartheid and white minority rule in South Africa. This political alliance comprised of Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Botswana (Smith, 1990:6) . The 'front line' was, a metaphor used to denote the geographical and political boundary between the independent, black-ruled states of the southern African region and the colonial and minority-ruled ones, which started with independent Tanzania's uncompromising condemnation of apartheid.
Various factors combined to create a regional environment which became increasingly unfavourable to the South African government's interests, and led to a shift in its regional strategy. For example, Angola and Mozambique's independence boosted popular resistance in South Africa. The 1976 Soweto uprising and the brutal state repression of the youths involved also refocused international criticism against South Africa. On the political front, the death of the young political activist, Steve Biko while in detention in 1977 further heightened international censure and catalysed internal opposition. South Africa's 'buffer zone' began to disintegrate when Angola and Mozambique became independent in 1975. Independent Angola offered refuge and military bases to the ANC and SWAPO. Luanda became the headquarters of SWAPO in exile, and SWAPO guerrillas were able to move easily across Namibia's northern border, using Angolan territory as a rear base. Mozambique offered military rear base support to ZANU, and hospitality to the ANC, although its headquarters remained in Lusaka, Zambia (Smith, 1990:9) . It was against this background of increasing internal, regional and international pressure on apartheid, that South Africa shaped the regional strategy which it pursued for most of the 1980s. From 1978 to 1989 the strategy was pre-eminently associated with the leadership of Prime Minister and later State President P.W. Botha. Apartheid South Africa believed that it stood alone in Africa against a 'total onslaught' by the Communist world spearheaded by subversive agents allied to Cuba and African proxies. It therefore became preoccupied with the defence and security of the apartheid state (Smith, 1990:10) . In response to the South African 'Total National Strategy' by 1979, the Frontline states (FLS) had laid a firm plan for an alternative regional economic body, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).
Established in 1980, SADCC was initially comprised of the independent states of the southern African region, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its goals were the promotion of regional co-operation through joint development projects, mobilising development assistance and reducing the economic dependence of member states on apartheid South Africa. In response to a rapidly changing regional and international political climate SADCC negotiated a new treaty. In 1992, SADCC was dissolved, and ten founding member states concluded a treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This was an international body with legal persona and mandate to promote economic integration, poverty alleviation, peace, security and the evolution of common political values and institutions. The treaty was signed in Windhoek, Namibia in 1992 (SADC, 1992 . The SADC treaty has common economic, environmental, political, peace and security goals for its members. As evident in its first three objectives, SADC seeks to achieve development and economic growth; evolve common political values, systems and institutions and promote and defend peace and security (SADC, 1995) . Three major aspects that currently distinguish SADC from SADCC are that, firstly it included the regional power, South Africa, secondly, its primary goal went beyond economic integration to encompass regional integration and thirdly, its mandate extended to the political and security spheres. As a regional body SADC is concerned with the promotion of sub-regional political and economic integration and security (Olonisakin & Levitt, 1999:70) . To this end, in 1996 the SADC Summit launched the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in pursuant of Article 9 of the SADC treaty. (SADC, 2001) . The protocol empowers SADC to take forcible military intervention in intra-state conflict to forestall large-scale warring and to ensure democracy by protecting the interests of a legitimate government. It furthermore, permits SADC to take action in interstate conflict to prevent cross-border aggression or the threat of such aggression or disagreement over territorial boundaries (SADC, 1996) . The OPDS is governed by a troika, comprising of the current Chair, the out-going Chair and the in-coming Chair of SADC. The troika system facilitates consultation and leadership by the present, past and next SADC chairpersons. The OPDS consults at summit, ministerial and technical levels. Its most active component is the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). This
Envisaged Role of SADC's OPDS
Organ is the foremost institution of SADC mandated to address issues relating to political stability, conflict prevention, management and resolution, democracy and human rights as well as issues pertaining to peace and security.
The general objective of the Organ is to promote peace and security in the region.
The specific objects of the OPDS are to promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within territories of state parties and to encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charter and Conventions of the African Union and the United Nations. The Organ also seeks to develop a collective security capacity including a Mutual Defence Pact for responding to external threats, and promoting peace-making and peace-keeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security in the sub-region. It further seeks to promote political co-operation among states and the evolution of common political values and institutions. More importantly, under Article, 2 (f) the organ is mandated to consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed (Article, 2 SADC, 1996) .
SADC MEDIATION IN ZIMBABWE'S GLOBAL POLITICAL AGREEMENT 27

SADC Mutual Defence Pact
The decision by SADC heads of states at their 2003 Summit to approve the establishment of the sub-region's Mutual Defence Pact has been of fundamental significance. Its adoption potentially and significantly contributes towards the attainment of a security community. In its definition of "destabilise", the pact acknowledges the best interests of both the state and its people. Article 1 (2) (c) of the pact for example provides for the necessity for constitutional changes of government. It however recognises the inadequacy of the state by defining collective self-defence, stipulating that states can only achieve sustainable peace, stability and security in the sub-region through participation and working together. The pact also acknowledges the limits of sovereignty; it notes that the sovereign state is in the medium and long term inimical to the interdependence of states of the southern African sub-region.
Theorising SADC Mediation -Security Community Theory
The security community theory propounded by Deutsch, et al. (1957:3-5) , theorises the means by which peace can be maintained in a regional organisation, such as SADC. Deutsch et al. (1957:5) conceptualises a security community as a group of people which has become integrated, and where integration is defined as the attainment, within a territory of a sense of community and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among the population. Deutsch, et al. (1957:5) elaborates further, the idea of peaceful change by defining it as the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force. This article recognises this as compatible with the provisions of the SADC Organ. For example it notes that Article 2 (b) (i) of the Protocol mandates the organ to decisively preside over large-scale violence between sections of the population, including acts of genocide and gross violations of human rights (SADC, 1996) .
The concept of security community emanates from the work of Karl Deutsch, who defined it as an assembly of people who think that they have come to an accord on the idea that social problems must and can only be settled by means of peaceful change (Taylor, 2014:136) . Within this contextualisation, Deutsch et al's (1957) Taylor (2014:136) therefore argues that, the notion that an inter-subjective set of norms has evolved whereby actors within a region share common ideas and understandings is integral to the idea of a security community. This therefore implies that those states that inhabit a security community have constructed not simply a stable order, but in fact a stable peace.
In Adler and Barnett's (1998:34) analytic framework of a security community mutual trust and collective identity among group states are necessary conditions for dependable expectations of peaceful change, and are thus normative benchmarks of a security community. Emerging from Adler and Barnett's (1998:34) framework is that, a community emerges and is set in motion by precipitating conditions that motivate states to adopt similar orientations and engage in cooperation and policy coordination. There is therefore an assumption that, when this happens over time a positive interplay of interactions, institutions, social learning and other factors generate the requisite trust and transnational identity, which are reciprocal and mutually reinforcing in the evolution and co-evolution of the basic tenets of regional integration. It can thus be deduced that, viewed in terms of security community theory, SADC can be viewed as an emerging security community, especially when and if focus is placed on regional security arrangements. The emergence of a security community however develops in phases, as described in the following section.
Security Community -The Phases
Community security theorists trace how security dynamics might through processes of confidence building and security interaction evolve into security communities where peace is predictable and violent conflict virtually unimaginable (Deutsch et al, 1957) .
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Adler and Barnett (1998:30) identified these phases as nascent, ascendant and mature.
They point out that, nascent security communities can be viewed as transnational regions comprising sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett, 1998:30) . They further argue that, at the other end of the continuum, a mature security community would include a mutual aid aspect and a system of rules that lie somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional centralised government. In their view it is something of a post-sovereign system, endowed with common supranational, transnational, and national institutions and some form of a collective security system (Adler and Barnett, 1998:30) . Adler and Barnett (1998:30) however, argue that security communities are very rare. They therefore advise that, it is would therefore be most useful to imagine them as evolving through different stages, 'nascent' security communities, through to 'ascendant' ones and then finally 'mature' ones.
Using Deutsch et al's (1957) 
Trust and Accountability
Critically important variables in Deusch's theorisation of security community are trust and accountability since communities depend on mutual trust (Fukuyama 2001:8-9 ). Trust and accountability are at the core of western democratic intellectual, constitutional and legal heritage. Hobbes for example, was concerned with providing incentives for compliance where citizens were envisaged as self-interested and distrusting individuals. On the contrary Locke put trust at the core of the relationships between citizens and their governments: society gives power to governors "whom society hath set over itself, with the express or tacit Trust, That it shall be employed for their good and the preservation of their property (Locke, 1690 cited in Laurian (2009 . Fukuyama (1995:26) conceptualises trust as "the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behaviour on commonly shared norms on the part of members of a community". Trust is thus a prerequisite for regional cooperation, for the resolution of collective security problems and for effective democratic governance.
Fukuyama further argues that the most effective organisations are based on communities of shared ethical values….such communities do not necessarily require extensive contracts or legal regulations of their relations, because prior moral consensus gives members of the group a basis for mutual trust (Fukuyama, 1995:26) . Similarly, Tilly The socio-cultural perspective focuses on trust as a social construct that characterises human relations. It posits that trust is formed by, and simultaneously shapes relational, historical, social and cultural contexts. Some scholars (Barber, 1983 ) adopt a systemic view of trust, viewing it as part of wider social systems, while others (Tilly, 2005) focus on its transactional and contingent characteristics. Social trust is necessary in establishing social relations. It enables social cohesion and provides the confidence necessary for orderly social and economic exchanges and political life. Trust is also critically important in the creation of and maintenance of social bonds and group identities. In turn, a sense of group identity promotes the legitimacy of institutions, encouraging voluntary deference to authorities and compliance with rules (Laurian, 2009:372) . Braithwaite (1998) and Kramer, et al. (1996) In his concept of the radius of trust Fukuyama (2001:8-9 ) posits that all groups embodying social capital have a certain radius of trust. The radius of trust is that circle of people among whom co-operative norms are operative. Given that trust facilitates cooperation, it is an important element of social capital. Putnam sees social trust as "improving the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action (Putnam, 1993:167) .
A regional organisation such as SADC should ideally be thought of as consisting of a series of concentric and overlapping radii of trust. Such trust is a key element in what Deustch et al (1957) identifies as "we-feeling" in successfully integrated regional organisations.
Democratic theory further emphasise the role of values and accountability. Like trust, the concept of accountability also has a long tradition in both political science and accounting, but only more recently in public administration and development administration (Lindberg, 2013:203) . Locke's theory of the superiority of representational democracy is built on the notion that accountability is only possible when the governed are separated from governors (Locke, 1980 (Locke, [1690 cited in Lindberg, 2013:203 Adejuwon (2012:27) refer to accountability as the ability to furnish satisfactory analyses and explanation of one's actions in the process of discharging one's responsibilities at all levels, whether technical, administrative, political, financial, or otherwise. In Hondenghorn's (1998:7) view accountability rests on both giving an account and on being held to account.
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Adejuwon (2012:28) postulates that the concept of accountability involves distinct stages; answerability and enforcement. Answerability is the obligation to provide information about decisions and actions and to justify to the public and to institutions of oversight. On the other hand, enforcement denotes the notion that the public or institution responsible for accountability can sanction the offending party or remedy the contravening behaviour (Adejuwon 2012:28) . Accountability is therefore a key determinant of the state of governance, as it promotes good governance in public affairs (Polidano and Hulme, 1997:68) . It also constitutes a powerful tool in the struggle for human rights implementation (Okechukwu, 2007:32 in (Adejuwon 2012:27) . Adejuwon (2012:27) posits that accountability has to be concerned with ensuring that those who wield power exercise it responsibly, so that they can be held accountable for their actions or inactions. Thus the demand in democracies is that there must be responsible use of power and authority and clear means of administrative accountability. Within this context, accountability and governance should thus be viewed as flip sides of the same coin (Carrington, et al. 2008:35) .
Emerging from this discussion is therefore that, accountability fosters good, ethical governance and is fundamentally needful for building public trust in leadership (Adejuwon 2012:34) . This view is predicated on the assumption that the normative basis of democracy is emphasis on regulated political competition through political means, with the expectation that conflicts are resolved by institutional means such as free and fair elections and devoid of electoral fraud and violence (Maoz and Russert, 1993:625) .
Thus, using the theory of security community and the related concepts of trust and accountability as analytical lenses, this article interrogates and reflects on SADC mediation in Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement (GPA). The intention is to unravel both opportunities and complexities and paradoxes in the operationalisation of SADC's principles and values, how they were expressed and acted upon in practice and the precarious position the OPDS found itself as it attempted to enforce the principles of peace, security, human rights and democracy set out in Article 4 of the SADC treaty as well as the provisions of the protocol on politics, defence and security co-operation.
Tracking the SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe's GPA
The Global Political Agreement (GPA) which brought about the inclusive "power sharing" government in Zimbabwe came as a result of a long drawn-out SADC mediation process. participation of the population in the democratic process (Kriger, 2008:362) .
The Minister further claimed that besides being in compliance with the SADC Guidelines, Zimbabwe was also a regional leader in democracy (Kriger, 2008:362) . Thus, to some extent, there was progress with, for example, the principles governing elections which have been accepted by all SADC countries. However, there clearly was need for more conceited commitment to some erosion of sovereignty by member states.
The ceding of some elements of sovereignty, to intergovernmental or supranational processes was still to take place, and this is a challenge that SADC will have to face up to. In Zimbabwe, in spite of the responsible Minister's claims, it can still be argued that (Kriger, 2008:364) .
Election observation was also restricted to countries that were deemed "friendly" to the Zimbabwean government. Some thorny issues thus still remained entrenched in Other items of importance to the nation were also not implemented; neither the Land Audit Commission nor the National Economic Council was constituted. Media issues to do with the Broadcasting Authority Board, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Board and the Mass Media Trust were also not attended to, and this was a cause for grave concern (Veritas Bill Watch, 2011) . The GPA which was the basis for creating a "power- Noting that most areas agreed to by the GPA parties in 2011 under the framework of "Zimbabwe Elections Road Map and Timelines had not been "adequately implemented", the SADC facilitator in the mediation, reported that, the decision to hold elections on 31
July was "fraught with legal contestation, political dispute and heightened tensions even Palloti (2013:18) diplomatic efforts at SADC mediation were caught between the redistributive nationalistic rhetoric of an authoritarian regime that trampled on human rights in the name of pursuing social justice, and the instrumentality of human rights in the neo-liberal development paradigm of the west. Palloti (2013:18) further notes that by embracing the later, SADC failed to address both the colonial legacies of inequality in the region, and the upholding of human rights in southern Africa.
A Reflection on the SADC Mediation -Lessons Learnt
There have been serious challenges with the implementation of GPA. The MDCs persistently raised concerns about the appointment of provincial governors, diplomats, senior public officials, the Attorney General and the Reserve Bank Governor. On the other hand members of ZANU (PF) often complained about the continuation of sanctions imposed on its senior figures, the reported establishment of parallel structures by the Prime Minister's office and the generally anti-ZANU (PF) radio broadcasts beamed from abroad. While these issues could have been solved, one mistake SADC made was that it failed to establish impartial structures to effectively monitor and evaluate the implementation of the GPA. Instead a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) were established, to ensure compliance, which comprised of members of the three coalition partners. This arrangement was fundamentally flawed and fallacious in that it was based on the misleading assumption of self-monitoring, thus largely leaving the full implementation of the GPA vulnerable to non-compliance.
However, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) now seems to be resolving this fallacy of self-monitoring, as it is setting up a Mediation
Unit. This stemmed from a recognition that one structural flaw has been SADC's lack of a standing regional mediation architecture. The envisaged structures include: the Panel of Elders, the Mediation Reference Group, and the Mediation Support Unit in the Organ (Dzinesa, 2013:199) . This is commendable as in the past the regional body's mediation has often been on an ad hoc basis. The establishment of SADC's mediation architecture, which is consistent with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter that encourages peaceful settlement of disputes through regional arrangements, it appears, is most likely to go a long way in enhancing coherence, synergy and the effectiveness of SADC's mediation efforts.
Such a mediation architecture is imperative, given that the inclusive Zimbabwe government after signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and a Global Political Agreement (GPA) could not implement issues that had been agreed between parties and SADC, it is evident that there has been a degree of failure to give effect and expression, especially to the SADC Summits' recommendations on unresolved and outstanding issues. Despite SADC's noble commitment, to promote the development of democratic institutions and practices and to encourage the observance of universal human rights, the resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis has been a sorry saga of delays, secrecy, purported agreements and nothing concrete coming out of it (Veritas Bill Watch, 2011) .
As argued by Nathan (2013:204) scholars often fall into the trap of claiming that SADC has been successful in the political and security spheres by virtue of having constructed an institutional framework comprising a treaty, protocols and mechanisms for security cooperation, peace-making and democratic governance. Nathan (2013:204) however argues against such a formalistic criterion, as he views it as grossly inadequate, in that it ignores pertinent questions, such as: Is the behaviour of member states consistent with the principles and objectives set out in the declarations? Does SADC take corrective action when a member state violates principles? And what is the actual impact of the mechanisms and declarations?
The Zimbabwe crisis is a classic example of a government in SADC which is reluctant to go along with the commitments it has signed, expressed through selective application, delayed implementation or just non-compliance (Taylor, 2014:137) . While this is not to say SADC is totally pointless in the security realm, however when one interrogates SADC's role as a mediator in the Zimbabwe crisis there are few success stories and far more procrastinations and unfulfilled commitments and empty promises. It remains the case that SADC does not have any regional mediation architecture to address security problems. As noted by Taylor (2014:137) this is not a question of capacity, but is about a lack of political will at the highest level. He further argues that the issue of agency and leadership is at the heart of policy decisions that may lead to a nascent security community. It can thus be argued that SADC is far from evolving into a nascent security community. While it is true that regional leaders rhetorically promote regionalism in 42 AFRICA'S PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY & PERFORMANCE REVIEW forums such as SADC, it is a regionalism that their own practices also undermine and subvert.
The SADC Guidelines on democratic elections, adopted by the Summit in 2004 are a manifestation of the gap between the official discourse and reality. For example the new electoral laws signed by the President of Zimbabwe in 2005 were patently inadequate, as they failed to ensure a level playing field and guarantee the rights and freedoms required for legitimate elections (Nathan, 2013:206) . As Nathan puts it, the most significant negative dynamic has been SADC's failure to promote the development of democratic institutions and practices. This failure has often been characterised by passivity, turning a blind eye (quiet diplomacy) to authoritarianism and repression in the region, especially in the case of Zimbabwe. By so doing the rule of law, the protection of the region's inhabitants and the status and credibility of SADC's legal instruments were undermined (Nathan, 2013:206) . This stems in large part from SADC's diversity and the fact that it has always had nondemocratic or semi-democratic states.
The Constitutional crisis in Swaziland, internal and external threats against the DRC, the legacy of war in Angola and political, economic and institutional fragility in Zimbabwe highlight OPDS weaknesses to resolve SADC internal problems. There is however strong theoretical evidence to suggest that shared values of democracy underpins relative success of regional security organisations. Regional integration and security architectures for a security community require political stability and effective conflict resolution mechanisms. Leadership in Southern Africa therefore need to assume more responsibility for reversing negative trends and creating regional 'public goods', through the OPDS and as such common regional positions are critically important.
Whatever the intentions of SADC leaders, the grouping lacks mechanisms to enforce its principles if they are violated. On the whole, SADC does not publicly engage with the 'internal affairs' of neighbours, even when evident violations of SADC principles regarding human rights and democracy have taken place. While the principles of non-interference and sovereign equality maybe stabilising factors, they also have negative consequences for the evolution of regional organisations.
SADC's efforts to create a regional security regime have been constrained and undermined by the weakness of member states, their fear of diluting sovereignty and most importantly, their lack of shared values as enshrined in the SADC Treaty. These interlinked and deep rooted political and structural dynamics prevent effective peacemaking and impair the functionality of the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security. Nathan, (2006:62) invokes the notion of internal and external logic of a regional organisation, especially in the sensitive domain of security. External logic refers to the advancement of state interests, in the absence of which states have little incentive to engage in co-operation and limit their discretionary decision-making. On the other hand internal logic refers to common values, in the absence of which states cannot achieve cohesion and adopt common policies and rules. If principles and norms provide the basic defining characteristic of a regional integration regime, it then follows that states that cannot reach agreement on core principles and norms are unable to establish an effective security community.
There is a paradigm shift towards new ways of understanding 'security'. Less emphasis and obsession is being placed on sovereignty and secure borders. The safety of individuals as well as the well-being of communities is now viewed as paramount (Ferreira and Henk, 2009:501) . Traditional models of security are to a large extent viewed as defective since they fail or neglect to stress the well-being of people. This view is consistent with the United Nations, which envisions that security should be 'people- Nathan (2013:206) has attributed SADC's poor record of peacekeeping and peace-building to three major problems: an absence of common values among member states, which militates against effective responses to crises and the development of mutual trust and common policies, the reluctance of member states to surrender a degree of sovereignty to multinational bodies, which is a sine qua non of regional integration; and the economic and administrative weakness of states, which affects all SADC's forums and programmes. Nathan (2013:206) Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) that was created in 1996.
As Nathan (2013:197) sees it, the wide variances in the political landscape of SADC member states, where we have democratic regimes (Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa, Seychelles) and authoritarian regimes (Angola, Swaziland, Zimbabwe), demonstrates a lack of shared values and this undermines a collective sense of purpose and cohesiveness in SADC. This is more so, as in Raftopoulos (2010:707) the GPA can be understood as a major aspect of the "passive revolution" in which in the case of Zimbabwe, a ruling party facing an organic political and economic crisis uses the space to reconfigure and renegotiate the terms of its existence with the opposition, civil society and the international community. Due to such deep-rooted problems which are structural Nathan (2013:206) postulates that they will not be overcome quickly or easily and thus SADC's future is mostly likely to be very similar to its past.
The SADC organ's ability to strengthen weak states and contribute to the democratic transformation of authoritarian states is severely constrained because its capacity, orientation and mandate derive from these states. The SADC organ cannot drive member countries' transformation or attend to their domestic security problems, because it is a forum of states that will not permit it to do this. Arguably, SADC can neither forge a genuine consensus on regional security and democratic governance, since major disputes relate to the primary political features as practised within member states and are not susceptible to negotiation and compromise. Within this reality, the attainment of an effectively functioning security community in southern Africa becomes more problematic and remains a regional challenge. To achieve progress in regionalism Southern African countries will have to tackle one of the most important prerequisites for viable interstate cooperation, transparent and legitimate political rule.
Domestic instability in the form of large-scale violence precludes the emergence of a security community. Reports of rampant lawlessness, "state sponsored" violence and suspect electoral processes in member states such as Zimbabwe are extremely worrying.
They generate tension and suspicion, and prevent the forging of trust and common identity. In national contexts, instability seriously undermines the security of citizens and the state. The inhabitants of a country wracked by violence cannot plausibly be said to live in security community. A security community should thus be defined to include dependable expectations of peaceful domestic change. On this basis structural instability and authoritarian rule are obstacles to the formation of security communities in the Southern African region. Regional organisations like SADC which include unstable countries will in spite of instruments such as the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security
Co-operation not progress to the status of mature security communities, if they focus exclusively on interstate relations and rigidly adhere to the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs.
SADC may engage in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building, with varying degrees of success, but its ability to strengthen weak states and transform authoritarian ones is severely constrained. Weak states unavoidably establish weak organisations, autocratic regimes set up multilateral forums that tolerate authoritarianism, and insecure governments loath regional integration with supranational authority. While attempts have been made to promote regional integration in other spheres of regional co-operation, the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security is bedevilled by challenges. A move towards strong value consensus can more effectively bring about the establishment of a mature security community for regional stability, peace and security within the SADC regional grouping.
Conclusion
The SADC mediation in Zimbabwe provides a litmus test for the regional body's capacity to resolve conflicts using mediation as a constructive and non-violent tool. SADC Summit of the SADC OPDSC in Livingstone, Zambia have to some extent demonstrated a SADC resolve to the Zimbabwe crisis. SADC can also be commended for the progress made in the daunting task of normalising the Zimbabwe situation, especially during the "power sharing" government under the GPA. The "dollarisation" of the currency for example, has had salutary effects on the economy; even though demand remained suppressed, some normalcy returned. However, the lethargic implementation of the SADC mediated Global Political Agreement (GPA) generated widespread criticism of SADC for feebly mediating the agreement which they so painstakingly helped to negotiate. When there are no obligations to adhere to SADC principles and values, when they do not suit the interests of the ruling elites, it becomes difficult to hold member states accountable for their actions and inactions. The Zimbabwe case study seems to suggest that SADC as an enforcement power and guarantor of the Zimbabwe GPA either lacked both power and authority or had been reluctant to hold the contending parties and the Zimbabwe government accountable. Regrettably, it allows itself to be utterly inadequate to the task of maintaining stable political environments, defending citizens of member states from authoritarian state power and promoting peace and security.
This had the effect of exposing SADC as a weak regional body. SADC's reputation, credibility and moral authority depends on its ability to hold member states accountable, otherwise, it will remain weak, and the problematic member states will take advantage of its weakness to sway it from its principled decisions. A structural flaw and gaping hole in SADC has also been the lack of a standing regional mediation architecture, which has only recently become the focus of remedial action. It is this article's contention that SADC should take decisive steps and re-establish itself as a credible and serious body capable of creating a security community that is progressive. A discussion and debate is thus critically important and imperative, especially around the notion of building a security community and on how best to socialize member states to overcome their differences in order to facilitate their recognition of core common values.
